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Introduction
In contests like political competitions, rent-seeking or R&D races, a contestant basically has two options to increase her probability of success. She can spend effort to improve her own performance and/or effort that reduces a particular rival's performance. The latter effort is usually understood as sabotage. There is a growing and interesting literature on sabotage or negative activities in contests and organizations, for example Auriol et al. (2003) , Chen (2003) , Konrad (2000) , Kräkel (2004) , Lazear (1989) , and Skarpedas and Grofman (1995) . The authors characterize equilibria in contests with sabotage and compare them with the equilibria when sabotage is not possible.
All these articles investigate single-stage contests 1 Motivated by these examples, this paper investigates sabotage of potential rivals.
We develop a two-stage elimination contest model with four players who differ in the valuation of winning the contest. In the first stage, the players are grouped in two semifinals. The winners of the semi-finals advance to the second stage, the final. Both stages are modeled as all-pay auctions. Sabotage is incorporated in the model by assuming that before the elimination contest each contestant can decide whether she will help the weaker player in the other semi-final. One may argue that this support should be called a "subsidy" instead of "sabotage". We prefer to use the term (indirect) sabotage because although a player indeed subsidizes a weaker player in another group, the main goal of the subsidy is to weaken the stronger player's chances of advancing to the next stage.
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In this setting, we find that for a certain partition of players there is a purestrategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. We also find that the most able contestant may prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another 2 Of Course, it is difficult to say whether Dean did not succeed because he was "sabotaged" by supporters of Bush or because he did not find enough supporters among the Democrats. Dean himself states that he was sabotaged. See his interview regarding the "The Scream" at the webpage http://www.crocuta.net/Dean/ Dean_Interview_NHPR_June29_2004.htm. Moreover, it is interesting to note that there were discussions among Bush supporters whether it is a suitable option "...to sabotage the opposing party's primary to ensure the nomination of the worst candidate possible" (http://www.pejmanesque.com/archives/003745.html). 3 In our model, this indirect sabotage is indeed equivalent to directly sabotaging the future rival. We use the indirect modeling since it is often observed in reality. For example, in the 2004 U.S. election campaign traditional Republican campaign contributors simultaneously contributed to Ralph Nader (an independent candidate) and George Bush. The contribution to Ralph Nader is to ensure that he draws away some votes from the Democratic candidate, John Kerry. Hence the Republicans indirectly sabotaged John Kerry through a third party, Ralph Nader. We wish to emphasize that this is an example of indirect sabotage. (i) maximization of total productive effort in the contest, (ii) maximization of the probability of a final among the two top players, and (iii) maximization of the win probability for the top player. They also compare the partitions with respect to the property that a higher ranked player has a higher win probability. In contrast, we focus mainly on the sabotage incentives of the contestants under different partitions.
The paper is organized as follows: the next section sets up the general model. In Section 3, we derive equilibria for specific partitions of players. Section 4 discusses our results and explains in more detail the relation to results obtained in previous sabotage models. Section 5 concludes.
Indirect Sabotage in an Elimination Contest
We consider a two-stage elimination contest as in Groh et al. (2003) . 4 However, unlike again by an all-pay auction.
We call the efforts in the all-pay auctions on stage 1 and 2 "productive effort".
They are directly productive in the sense that a possible contest-designer puts a positive value on them. For example, in a sales contest, these efforts will be sales per contestant.
But the sabotage effort in stage 0 is directly "unproductive" because the contest designer does not value this effort. Note, however, that we only focus on the positive implications of sabotage and do not discuss the optimal design of our contest.
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Our equilibrium concept is subgame perfection. We look for a subgame perfect equilibrium of our game by backward induction. We begin with stage 2: Denote the two finalists by with It is well known that the equilibrium effort levels in such an all-pay auction are in mixed strategies. Based on results in Baye et al. (1996) and Hillman and Riley (1989), we can write the expected payoffs of player i and j in this equilibrium respectively as
If , the equilibrium winning probabilities of player i and j are
, and equilibrium total expected effort amounts to
In case of , we simply have to exchange the indices i and j in order to obtain the equilibrium winning probabilities and equilibrium total effort. For a given partition of players, the equilibrium in stage 2 is unique (see, Baye et al., 1996) .
Let us now formalize stage 1. We denote the players in one semi-final by and in the other semi-final by 
where is the probability that n wins her semi-final against m. 
where is the probability that wins her semi-final against h. The equilibria in the semi-finals are again in mixed-strategies. The equilibrium in each group is unique and can be characterized in the same way as the equilibrium in stage 2: The expected payoffs 1 p 6 For the sake of analysis and to help focus on the role of sabotaging potential rivals, we do not consider sabotage of current rivals as in the single-state contests of Konrad (1999) , Chen (2003) , and Kräkel (2004) . Moreover, note that in stage 2, the players' valuations revert to V i and V j . That is, the effect of sabotage is not permanent. 7 To give the reader an idea of how the help given to a player in a contest might increase her valuation, consider a contest where a player has a cost of effort e and valuation, V. If the success probability is P, we can write her payoff as PV -e. Suppose someone subsidies her cost of effort such that (1-α) of her cost is reimbursed, where 0 < α < 1. Then her payoff is now PV -αe. But this can re-written as α[PV/α -e]. Given that α is constant, this is equivalent to the original contest with no subsidy but with a player whose valuation has increased from V to V/α. Hence, we capture the help given to a player as an increase in her valuation.
6 are analogous to (1) except for replacing the V's by the Π 's defined in (2) -(5). And also the equilibrium total effort and the equilibrium winning probabilities, and , can be computed with the help of (2) -(5). In doing so, it is important to note that the valuations (2) - (5) 
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The players' payoff in (6) -(9) equals the expected payoff the players receive from the semi-final (the maximum terms) less the sabotage efforts. In stage 0, we look for a purestrategy equilibrium in the sabotage effort levels.
Equilibrium under Different Seedings of Players
There are different partitions of players in the semi-finals. These partitions are called seedings. Obviously, the properties of the equilibrium in our three-stage contest game depend on the seeding in the semi-finals. In what follows, we will therefore characterize the equilibrium for different seedings.
Seeding A: {1-3} and {2-4}
Suppose first that, in stage 1, players 1 and 3 belong to one group and players 2 and 4 belong to the other group (we call this grouping of players seeding A). In the notation of the previous section, we have 1 h = , 3 = , 2 m = and 4 n = . Obviously, player 4 will not engage in sabotage, i.e. Given these insights and taking into account the equilibrium expected payoffs (1) in the final, we may specify the players' semi-final valuations (2) - (5) as 
In stage 2, player 2's net payoff if she meets player 3 instead of player 1 is . This is an upper bound for her support of player 3, i.e.,
. In the semi-final between players 1 and 3, we then obtain from (10) and (11) ( 
given . Thus, no matter the relative size of the valuations and , player 1 has a higher valuation than player 3 in stage 1 (i.e., 
. It follows that when they contest in an all-pay auction in stage 1, player 1 will get a positive expected payoff, but player 3 will get a zero expected payoff.
Hence, implies that in stage 0 player 3 will not invest in sabotage.
Therefore, in a reduced-form game obtained via backward induction, is a dominant strategy for player 3 in stage 0. 
The equilibrium is such that,
and . 
The fixed point of these equations with respect to 
The lowest sabotage effort which player 1 can choose in case 1 is the one which equates and or, equivalently, which reduces the winning probability of player 4 to 
This implies that, in case 1, player 1 always chooses an interior solution .
This is the solution to = 0 in (21) 
Seeding B: {1-2} and {3-4}
Now suppose the two strongest players are grouped in one semi-final and the two weakest players in the other semi-final (we call this grouping seeding B). In the notation of section 2, we may write , 2 h = 1 = , 4 m = and 3 n = . If at all, players 1 and 2 will benefit only from indirectly sabotaging player 3 and players 3 and 4 only from sabotaging player 1. Hence, we can already identify 0 e e e e 41 31 23 13
as dominant strategies.
Given this insight and computing the equilibrium expected payoffs (1) in the final, we may now specify the players' semi-final valuations (2) - (5) as 
where is the probability that player 3 advances to the final and is the probability that player 1 advances to the final. Players 3 and 4 have a smaller valuation of the final than players 1 and 2. Hence, both know that, even if they win the semi-final, the payoff in the final will be k, independent of whether they play the final against player 1 or player 2. Hence, indirectly sabotaging player 1 does not pay for the two weakest players, so they choose a zero sabotage effort.
Player 1 is stronger than player 2 in the semi-final among the two strongest players. The insight of this proposition is that in seeding C we cannot have pure-strategy equilibria as those derived in seedings A and B. The intuition of part (i) is that in seeding C, player 2 has the highest benefit from sabotage (i.e., V 2 -V 4 ). Hence, an equilibrium in which player 1 -who has a lower benefit from sabotage (i.e., V 2 -V 3 ) -invests in sabotage but player 2 does not, is not possible. The rational of part (ii) is that, in contrast to seeding B, in both semi-finals of seeding C at least one player would benefit from sabotage (remember that in the semi-final {3,4} under seeding B none of the players 19 benefits from sabotage and this is the driving force for the no-sabotage equilibrium in proposition 3).
Notice that also in seeding C player 4 does not engage in sabotage. For players 2 and 3, only one of them will engage in sabotage, because at least one of them will not have a bigger semi-final valuation than the other. Hence, proposition 4 implies that an equilibrium, if it exists, must have the property that at least one player (either 2 or 3) and at most two players (1 and 2 or 1 and 3) will engage in sabotage. If there exists an equilibrium in which only one player invests in sabotage, that player cannot be player 1, given proposition 4(i). But if player 1 does not invest in sabotage, then player 2 has a bigger semi-final valuation than player 3. Therefore, if only one player engages in sabotage, then that player must be player 2. Unfortunately, due to the discontinuity of the winning probabilities and the payoff functions which lead to proposition 4 (see the proof in appendix B), it is difficult to analytically derive an equilibrium for seeding C in the case of V 1 > V 2 > V 3 > V 4 .
In appendix C, we show that in case of V 1 > V 2 = V 3 > V 4 , there is a purestrategy subgame perfect equilibrium under seeding C in which no player engages in sabotage. Indeed, if V 2 = V 3 (b = 0), then it is straightforward to show that there is no sabotage in any of the seedings. But this insight implies that V 2 > V 3 is crucial to the sabotage equilibrium we derived in proposition 1 for seeding A. 
4.
Discussion of Results
In proposition 1, the result that 2 1 p 41 > is interesting. Player 4 has a higher winning probability than player 2 in the semi-final although player 2 has a higher ability. Chen 14 Player 2 has a higher success probability if sabotage is not feasible. She prefers the no-sabotage equilibrium (i.e., when sabotage is not feasible) because her payoff is positive which is greater than her zero payoff in the sabotage equilibrium. Player 3 is indifferent because her payoff is zero in both equilibria but player 4 prefers the sabotage equilibrium. In sum, if the goal is to improve the selection properties of the contest, then allowing sabotage is bad because the top two players, 1 and 2, have lower success probabilities in the sabotage equilibrium than in the no-sabotage equilibrium. However, the sabotage equilibrium may be preferred by some of the players including the most able player.
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Indeed, a difference between our result and Chen (2003) is that the most able player may be better off when indirect sabotage is allowed. This result is not possible in Chen (2003) , where only direct sabotage is allowed. Another difference is that in Chen (2003) it is never the case that a more able player engages in sabotage but a less able player does not. 15 In our model, this is possible. In seeding A, it is not surprising that player 1 is the only one who engages in sabotage once we notice that she derives the highest benefit from sabotage. The benefits of a successful sabotage are V 2 -V 4 , V 2 -V 3 , V 3 -V 4 , and zero to players 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. It is easy to see that V 2 -V 4 is the highest of these benefits.
It is insightful to examine the difference in results between seedings A and B.
The main difference between proposition 1 (seeding A) and proposition 3 (seeding B) is It is important to note that sabotage and productive effort are not perfect substitutes although they both have the same constant marginal costs. This is because a player has to first think of winning before sabotaging. In other words, it may make sense to invest in only productive effort and nothing in sabotage but it never makes sense to invest in only sabotage but invest nothing in productive effort. There is no point in investing in sabotage, if you have no chance of winning.
To obtain proposition 1, we assumed that V 1 -V 2 ≥ V 2 -V 3 . This condition ensures that player 3 will not invest in sabotage because her expected payoff in stage 1 is zero. However, player 3's valuation is increasing in the sabotage effort of player 2. Also, player 2's valuation is increasing in 31 Π . Therefore, player 2 derives a benefit from helping player 3. The reason why player 2 sets e 23 = 0 is because while there are benefits of sabotaging, the cost required to do so is too much. Note also that even though player 1's payoff is always positive, it decreases as 31 Π increases but is never zero, given
Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored a hitherto uncharted area of research on contests: the sabotage of potential rivals. The only papers which examine sabotage in a model with non-identical players are Chen (2003) and Kräkel (2004) . In these models, where players sabotage current rivals, there is always an equilibrium in which someone engages in sabotage. In contrast, in our model, where players sabotage potential rivals there could be a unique equilibrium with no sabotage. We also find that only the most-able player may engage in sabotage and indeed prefers a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is banned. While our analysis was based on certain simplifying assumptions, we were still able to obtain interesting results which had not been known in the literature.
There are several possible areas of future research. For example, in proving proposition 1, we had to assume a special condition which simplified the analysis significantly. A possible task for future research is to relax this condition, but it should be noted that this is fairly challenging. Another extension would be to incorporate the sabotage of current rivals in addition to the sabotage of potential rivals in the same model. We could also consider making sabotage permanent. That is, helping a weaker player to win in the semi-final makes this player stronger if she advances to the final. 
This completes the proof of the first part of proposition 2.
For proving , note that Groh et al. (2003) show
In our sabotage equilibrium we obtain ( ) 
This condition is always satisfied, since due to it can be written as . In the same way, we obtain 
